Philosophy through video games

Clearly this book is intended for professional academics. However, it can serve as a point of departure to introduce anyone knowledgeable about the gaming phenomenon but lacking a philosophical background the book serves it purpose well in this regard.

I came across the book by happenstance and was captured by the author’s approach from the beginning especially since I am totally unfamiliar with the genesis of the contemporary gaming phenomenon. In light of gaming’s popular interest, I did expect more than one review for the book on Amazon. But perhaps that speaks to the status of philosophy in contemporary North American culture. In their Preface the authors note that not all individuals are philosophically inclined and accordingly state that they draw upon the resources of Western philosophy, i.e., the analytical tradition. Although, as I read through the chapters there seemed to be moments when a phenomenological understanding (not phenomenalism) was given some expression. This review is from the point of view of a phenomenological philosopher and hopefully my observations will bring out some valued differing approaches to the interpretation between the analytic and phenomenological (Continental) ways of thinking. Naturally, not all that could be said, has been said in this review.

Chapter One, I, Player: The Puzzle of Personal Identity (MMORPGs and Virtual Communities)discusses personal identity through statements about the person, rather than inquiring into the constitution of the person as a living organism. The authors “focus on issues about the metaphysical status of the self that arise specifically in the status of video games.” For the phenomenologist, the problem here is the same for the analytical philosopher, i.e., that the metaphysical status of the self does not equate to the person. Rather than on an epistemological approach to this problem the phenomenologist properly focuses on human consciousness as a psychological understanding but interpreted philosophically. That is to say, where the epistemologist encounters a puzzle in life, the phenomenologist encounters the mystery of life. While both approaches are grounded in individual experience, a Hellenic-grounded interpretive philosophy may not be the only view point for a satisfactory personal understanding. A phenomenological philosophy of consciousness interprets the individual’s “life in progress,” not a static “state” in life. Gaming has the potential to reveal a philosophical anthropology of the person, not only a philosophy of human functional abilities, it seems to me.

Chapter Two, The Game Inside the Mind, the Mind Inside the Game (The Nintendo Wii Gaming Console) discusses the “tools” of gaming in light of the unsatisfactory theory of phenomenalism. The authors suggest that enactivism as a theory is the better approach, thus remaining within the Hellenic epistemological tradition which attempts to ascertain the manner in which experience represents the way things are. The phenomenologist attempts the same to disclose the way things are in the experience of the person, but through the medium of consciousness, not the classical perspective of knowledge. Hence, the phenomenologist (a philosopher of the mind) attempts to transcend the limitations of analytic philosophy by identifying a different starting point for reflection, rather than develop further the scientific one that remains dominant in Western culture. The phenomenological starting point of conscious interpretation has been influenced more by Continental philosophy than by scientific methodology.

Chapter Three, “Realistic Blood and Gore”: Do Violent Games Make Violent Gamers? (First Person Shooters) discusses the heritage of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical understandings in approaching the design of games, particularly with respect to violence. The authors’ Hellenic and thus Christian interpretation makes their conclusions and preferences predictable concerning the ethical norms to be considered when designing games. (I wonder: Is there any significance to be drawn that Chapter Three ends with a “Concluding Homily,” and Chapter Seven with “The Games We Choose;” whereas all the other chapters, save Chapter Four which has no “Conclusion,” end simply with “Conclusions?”)

Chapter Four, Games and God’s Goodness (World-Builder and Tycoon Games) clearly reveals the traditional approach to understanding God within Western culture with all its attending problems and contradictions. The authors, being analytical philosophers, accept reason as the faculty that specifies the living organism as a person – an epistemological perspective rooted in classical philosophy. Many phenomenologists however, consider possessing a self-reflexive function of consciousness as specifying the living organism as a person – a psychological perspective considered philosophically, not scientifically. Here the is focus is on the person; not on principles or propositions of knowledge. Terminating their discussion, the lesson to be learned the authors state is that to understand God even as “a being with unimaginably vast knowledge, power, and goodness, decisions about when and how to interfere with the natural order…,” would have to be atrociously difficult and demanding. The phenomenologist does not understand such difficulties arising from God interfering with the natural order, but such difficulties arise from ourself-conscious relationships within the natural order.

Chapter Five, The Metaphysics of Interactive Art (Puzzle and Adventure Games) hints, as I see it, at a phenomenological understanding which is not evident in the classical heritage of Western philosophy. That is, the creative participation of the observer in what is observed is a novel perspective with no antecedent in Hellenic philosophy. This changes the overall paradigm from a purely Hellenic one, where Fate rules the day, to a phenomenological one, where humans contribute to the determination of their future. The authors speak of “The Objectivity Argument,” which is an active process and not to be confused with “objectivism” which is an idea. [When philosophizing in English, individuals often confuse “- ity” words with “-ism” words. Although addressing the same phenomenon, they do not always mean the same. Consider this statement: “I respect your nationality, but I am suspicious of your nationalism.” In short, realism does not capture all of reality.] Such distinction is often not clearly made or understood by contemporary philosophers. The objectivity argument attaches to the person, not an external standard. In fact, I can learn much from understanding “your personal psychology” (p. 95). In short, for the phenomenologist intersubjectivity (an activity) replaces external standards (objective ideas). Drawing on Stanley Fish the authors speak of a player’s actions and decisions understood as “coconstituting the work of art” (p.100).

Chapter Six, Artificial and Human Intelligence (Single-Player RPGs) treats of AI in the context of time. Predictably, a Hellenist approach to time is accepted without question. That is, time is linear, not cyclic. Philosophically cyclic time has no beginning, or end, as linear time does, hence a cyclic understanding of time is favoured by phenomenologists. As well, the correspondence theory of truth is accepted as the norm. In explaining the development of CRUM (Computational-Representational Understanding of Mind), it is presumed that the rules of the English language are operative and these have contributed the basis of “computer language.” The discussion of the phenomenon is undertaken from this perspective. Given that the ontic culture of the West and not any phenomenological culture has given rise to computer science, this is not surprising. Acknowledging that the “flexible adaptive behavior characteristic of human cognition,” to use the authors’ words, is an activity, not a fixed reality, the authors then enter on a discussion of “fixing” the content. For the phenomenological philosopher content is dynamic, not fixed. Flexible adaptive behavior has not, to date at least, been replicated by computers. At present, phenomenologists do not hold out any expectation that a non-living entity ever will spontaneously “adapt” itself to its environment. The “I’m sorry, Dave I can’t do that” remark of 2001 Space Odyssey fame remains in the imagination and as a puzzle before the analytical philosopher. It presents as a possible mystery for the phenomenologist, who questions the “fixity” of content.

The final chapter, Epilogue: Video Games and the Meaning of Life sums up the whole thrust of the author’s purpose which, as I understand it, is to investigate the games phenomenon as a means to introduce philosophical thinking. This enterprise has considered only the Western analytical perspective, which is not surprising since it is highly doubtful that the computer phenomenon could have arisen in any context but within the Western scientific tradition with its roots in Hellenic philosophy. This is similar to the notion that atheism could only have arisen with the Christian culture, (due to scientific criticism) and not in any phenomenological culture. As it reads the whole book, to my mind, is an exercise in the “fine tuning” approach to classical philosophy through gaming. But there is more. The authors remark: “And perhaps, therefore, philosophical questions about the meaning of life are better re-phrased as questions about what we are to do with ourselves after we have finished all of our basic, unalterable biological “functions” (p. 154). To shift the understanding of gaming as disclosing a phenomenological philosophy, I would suggest that this to do question could be replaced with a who am I question inquiring into the meaning of life. That is, the awareness of the time spent gaming is not as revealing philosophically in the contemporary culture as who is gaming, it would seem to me. [Savage, A: academia.edu]